Wednesday, June 3, 2026
OFAC Sanctions Iran's Four Largest Crypto Exchanges: What Every Compliance Team Needs to Know
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On June 2, 2026, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated four Iranian cryptocurrency exchanges: Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex, along with four individual executives, in the largest-ever enforcement action targeting Iran's digital asset sector.
This is not a routine SDN update. The scale of the entities involved, the explicit secondary sanctions attached to all four designations, and the simultaneous issuance of a new OFAC FAQ (numbered 1257) signal that OFAC is treating Iran's domestic crypto infrastructure as a systemic threat requiring immediate global compliance response, not just a U.S.-person compliance update.
For VASPs, banks, stablecoin issuers, and any financial institution with exposure to digital assets, the compliance response window opened on June 2. There is no grace period when an SDN designation carries secondary sanctions.
To understand the scope of this action, it helps to understand what these exchanges actually represent in the context of Iran's financial isolation.
Iran has been cut off from the SWIFT international banking network since 2012. Over the following decade, the country developed a domestic digital asset infrastructure that now functions as a parallel financial system, allowing the Iranian government, its central bank, and affiliated entities to move value internationally without using correspondent banking.
Scorechain blockchain monitoring of Iranian exchange flows tracked substantial transaction volume growth through 2025, even as the broader Iranian economy deteriorated under U.S. and European sanctions pressure and the impact of U.S. and Israeli military operations. On-chain data reviewed by Scorechain's analysis team confirms that IRGC-linked wallet clusters represented a dominant share of Iranian crypto inflows in the period leading up to the June 2 action, a pattern fully consistent with OFAC's designation rationale and the scale of entities targeted.
The mechanism is straightforward: Iranian rials are converted into stablecoins, primarily USDT on the TRON and Ethereum networks, through domestic exchanges. Those stablecoins are then transmitted to international counterparties to settle trade contracts, service IRGC operational budgets, and allow regime-connected individuals to move wealth offshore. In April 2026, Tether froze $344.2 million held in two wallets attributed directly to the Central Bank of Iran, in what public reports described as the largest single on-chain freeze of Iranian sovereign crypto reserves on record.
Nobitex sat at the operational center of this system. The June 2 action targets the primary on-ramp and off-ramp of that infrastructure.
Nobitex is Iran's largest cryptocurrency exchange by a wide margin, processing more than 50 percent of all Iranian digital asset inflows in 2025. At peak activity it handled roughly 70 percent of Iran's total crypto volume and serves approximately 11 million registered users, around 12 percent of Iran's population.
OFAC designated Nobitex under two authorities:
EO 13224: for providing material support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Specific allegations include processing transactions for IRGC-affiliated ransomware actors and facilitating the Central Bank of Iran's stablecoin operations.
EO 13902: for operating in Iran's financial sector.
OFAC further alleged that following the commencement of U.S. combat operations in Iran, Nobitex played an active role in protecting and moving assets despite government-imposed internet blackouts, specifically to shield regime wealth. The exchange had previously survived a $90 million hack by the pro-Israel group Predatory Sparrow (Gonjeshke Darande) in June 2025, and according to OFAC its chairman, Amir Hossein Rad, was specifically involved in reconstituting operations afterward.
Designated individuals connected to Nobitex:
The Kharrazi designation is significant. The two co-founders are members of one of the most politically connected dynasties in the Islamic Republic, with documented ties to the country's new supreme leader. Corporate records show they originally registered the exchange under a surname rarely associated with the Kharrazi family name, raising questions about deliberate identity obscuring at the point of incorporation.
Wallex is Iran's second-largest exchange by crypto inflow volume, receiving approximately 12 percent of Iranian digital asset inflows in 2025. OFAC alleged Wallex enabled IRGC-linked transactions and operated as part of the same domestic crypto infrastructure supporting sanctions evasion.
Bitpin accounted for roughly 10 percent of Iranian digital asset inflows in 2025. OFAC alleged Bitpin processed millions of dollars in transactions linked to the IRGC. Bitpin operates from the Anzali Free Zone in Gilan province.
Ramzinex, founded in Tehran in 2018 and based at the Sharif Technology Tower, has processed more than $2.45 billion in lifetime transactions. OFAC alleged those transactions included activity connected to the IRGC and a government-backed Iranian financial institution. Ramzinex is the smallest of the four designated exchanges by volume but represents a substantial long-term evasion vector given its transaction history.
Primary sanctions bind U.S. persons and entities directly. Secondary sanctions extend that legal risk to foreign financial institutions.
OFAC has explicitly attached secondary sanctions to all four designations. This means any non-U.S. financial institution, including VASPs, banks, and stablecoin issuers registered and operating outside U.S. jurisdiction, that continues to process transactions for Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, or Ramzinex after June 2, 2026, risks being cut off from the U.S. financial system entirely.
In practical terms, secondary sanctions exposure includes:
This is the same secondary sanctions mechanism used against Garantex (Russia) and against entities involved in Iranian oil trade. The extension of that mechanism to domestic Iranian crypto exchanges marks a significant escalation in how OFAC treats digital asset infrastructure in sanctioned jurisdictions.
OFAC also clarified earlier in 2026 that Iranian digital asset exchanges are considered blocked financial institutions regardless of whether they appear on the SDN list. An explicit SDN designation, as issued on June 2, additionally triggers secondary sanctions against global counterparties and gives stablecoin issuers direct legal justification for bulk address freezes.
Immediate action required:
Sanctions screening lists must be updated to include all SDN addresses associated with Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex, as well as the four designated individuals. Any property or interests in property of designated entities that are in your custody or under your control must be blocked and reported to OFAC within 10 business days.
Beyond direct address matching, transaction monitoring should be reviewed for indirect exposure. Iranian routing patterns typically involve stablecoin deposits (primarily USDT on TRON), chain-hopping through intermediate wallets, and withdrawal to international exchanges. Platforms with weak monitoring for these routing patterns face elevated risk.
Entities owned 50 percent or more by any of the designated exchanges or individuals are automatically blocked under OFAC's 50 percent rule, even if not individually listed.
Banks with digital asset custody or correspondent relationships connected to VASP counterparties should conduct a counterparty review to assess whether any VASP they service has exposure to the designated exchanges. Secondary sanctions exposure does not require direct interaction with the Iranian entities; it can be triggered by providing material financial services to a firm that knowingly facilitates transactions for them.
Tether and Circle, as the primary stablecoin issuers whose tokens are used in Iranian crypto infrastructure, face renewed pressure to demonstrate real-time blocking of the newly designated addresses. In April 2026, Tether demonstrated that bulk address freezes at the issuer level are operationally feasible when acting on an OFAC designation. The June 2 designations provide the same direct legal justification.
Any stablecoin issuer that cannot demonstrate they have updated their screening protocols to reflect the June 2 SDN additions is in a materially weaker compliance position than before this action.
For European firms regulated under MiCA, DORA, or the 6AMLD framework, OFAC designations do not automatically create an EU legal obligation in the same way they do for U.S. persons. However, secondary sanctions exposure is a real business risk regardless of EU regulatory status, because it threatens access to U.S. dollar liquidity and correspondent banking regardless of where the firm is domiciled. EU-regulated VASPs and banks should treat the June 2 designations as a risk-based trigger for an urgent screening update, particularly for any customers with Iranian IP addresses, rial-to-stablecoin transaction patterns, or known Iranian counterparty relationships.
The June 2, 2026 action is the most visible point in a coordinated, escalating enforcement campaign that has been building for at least six months:
The trajectory suggests further enforcement targeting Iranian crypto vectors is likely. OFAC has now demonstrated that it will designate entities at every layer of Iran's digital asset infrastructure: sovereign reserve wallets, domestic exchange platforms, foreign-registered exchange proxies, and individual executives.
Three capabilities now separate compliant firms from exposed ones:
1. Real-time SDN address coverage Name-matching at onboarding is not sufficient. The designated individuals and entities control wallets that may not all be explicitly listed in the first SDN update. Effective coverage requires blockchain analytics that map cluster-level exposure, meaning wallets with demonstrated on-chain connections to the designated entities, even if not individually named in the SDN entry. Scorechain's KYT and screening modules have been updated to reflect June 2 designations and associated address clusters.
2. Continuous transaction monitoring for Iranian routing patterns Scorechain's analysis of Iranian exchange activity identifies consistent evasion typologies: large USDT inflows on TRON from Iranian-linked wallets, structured fragmentation before bridging to Ethereum, and eventual deposits to international exchanges through layered intermediaries. A single point-in-time screening update is not a substitute for ongoing monitoring calibrated to these patterns.
3. Documented audit trail OFAC enforcement actions increasingly hold firms to a strict liability standard. Demonstrating that your firm identified, blocked, and reported exposure within the required 10-business-day window requires a documented process, not just a technical one. Compliance teams should confirm they have an established workflow for logging SDN hits, blocking property, and filing reports with OFAC.
OFAC designated four exchanges: Nobitex (Iran's largest, 50%+ of Iranian crypto inflows in 2025), Wallex (12%), Bitpin (10%), and Ramzinex (founded 2018, $2.45B in lifetime volume).
Nobitex was designated under EO 13224 (counterterrorism, for IRGC material support) and EO 13902 (Iran financial sector). The other exchanges were designated under Iran-related authorities.
Amir Hossein Rad (Nobitex chairman and former CEO), Seyed Ali Khoee (current CEO), Seyed Mohammad Ali Aghamir (co-founder, Kharrazi family), and Seyed Mohammad Aghamir (co-founder, Kharrazi family).
Yes. All four designations carry explicit secondary sanctions. Any foreign financial institution that continues to process transactions for these entities after June 2, 2026, risks being cut off from the U.S. financial system, regardless of where it is incorporated or regulated.
Under OFAC's 50 percent rule, any entity owned 50 percent or more by a designated person or entity is automatically blocked, even if not individually listed on the SDN list. This means subsidiaries, affiliated wallets, and controlled accounts of Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex are blocked without requiring a separate OFAC action.
It must immediately block access to the funds (not reject, which would return them to the sender), and report the blocked property to OFAC within 10 business days. The assets must remain frozen until OFAC authorizes release.
OFAC issued a new Iran-related FAQ numbered 1257 alongside the June 2 designations. Firms should review this FAQ directly on the OFAC website as it provides authoritative interpretive guidance specific to this action.
MiCA creates an EU-level AML and licensing framework for VASPs but does not override secondary sanctions risk. EU-regulated firms can be fully MiCA-compliant and still face secondary sanctions exposure if they continue transacting with SDN-listed Iranian entities. These are parallel obligations.
USDT (Tether) on TRON and Ethereum are the primary stablecoin vectors identified in Scorechain's monitoring of Iranian exchange activity and confirmed by OFAC's designation rationale. The Central Bank of Iran reportedly used Nobitex to access at least $507 million in USDT through a UAE-based broker, converting stablecoins into rials outside the international banking system.
Yes. Scorechain has updated entity labels and risk signals for the designated addresses associated with all four exchanges and the four individuals across its KYT and sanctions screening modules. Contact the Scorechain team to confirm your current coverage configuration.
The June 2, 2026 OFAC action confirms that Iran's crypto infrastructure is now a primary enforcement target, not a peripheral concern. The designation of four exchanges covering more than 70 percent of Iranian crypto volume, combined with explicit secondary sanctions and a new FAQ, creates a clear compliance threshold: screen and monitor now, or carry the liability.
Scorechain provides continuous KYT coverage and sanctions screening across major blockchains, with entity coverage updated to reflect the June 2026 designations.
Analysis based on Scorechain blockchain monitoring and on-chain data review.
Primary government source: U.S. Treasury OFAC press release sb0519 and SDN list update, June 2, 2026. OFAC FAQ 1257 (Iran-related) issued concurrently.
